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Abstract
Prospect theory [4] of risky choices has been extended to encompass
intertemporal choices [6]. Presentation of intertemporal prospect theory
suffers from minor mistakes, however [2]. To clarify the theory we restate
it and show further mistakes in current presentations ([6], [2]) of value and
discount functions.
AMS Subject classification: 91B16
Keywords: Discount utility theory, intertemporal choice, prospect theory
1 Introduction
Choice under risk trades off utility between alternative situations whereas
choice over time trades off utility between alternative periods.
Microeconomics tackles risk by simply extending fundamental choice
theory; this is expected utility theory [11]. Intertemporal choices are
explained by discount utility theory [8].
As it happens, several anomalies have been well documented through
experiments. Prospect theory has stepped in to take these into account
and suggest an alternative paradigm to explain risky choices [4]. Both the
anomalies and prospect theory are likely to be brain wired ([3], [10]).
Prospect theory of risky choices itself has been extended to encompass
intertemporal choices [6]. Yet it has been claimed that such an
“intertemporal” prospect theory suffers from minor mathematical errors [2].
Our task in this note is to reexamine Loewenstein and Prelec’s [6]
theory by taking into account Al-Nowaihi and Dhami’s [2] claims. The
assumptions underlying value and discount functions are restated more neatly.
Incidentally we point out further mistakes in both papers. Our aim is to help
perfect presentation of intertemporal prospect theory.
Section 2 restates the theory. Section 3 evaluates the previous corrections
to the theory, and Section 4 concludes.
2 Restating the assumptions
To find value and discount functions, it is useful restating Loewenstein and
Prelec (LP)’s assumptions as follows.
A1 (impatience). Discount function φ : [0,∞) −→ (0,∞) is strictly
decreasing in an arbitrarily small interval. (A1 is not made explicit in
LP, as Al-Nowaihi and Dhami (AD) observe.)
A2 (gain-loss asymmetry). If 0 < x < y and υ(x) = υ(y)φ(t) , then
υ(−x) > υ(−y)φ(t). (υ(·) is the value function for consumption plan
outcomes x and y.)
A3 (absolute magnitude effect). If 0 < x < y, υ(x) = υ(y)φ(t) and a > 1,
then υ(ax) < υ(ay)φ(t).
A4 (common difference effect). If 0 < x < y, υ(x) = υ(y)φ(t) and
s > 0, then υ(x)φ(s) < υ(y)φ(s + t) . (Common difference effect is one
behavioral finding contradicting discount utility theory; it captures the
fact that preferences between two delayed outcomes often switch when
both delays are incremented by a given constant amount.)
The assumptions above come from (experimentally) well documented
anomalies in discount utility theory. (LP (p. 578) refer to delay-speedup
asymmetry as another key anomaly, though they do not consider it in their
theory.) In particular, assumptions A1 and A4 suffice to derive a generalized
hyperbolic discount function φ that encompasses the exponential function as
a particular case.
Rather than A4, AD employ
A5 (common difference effect with quadratic delay). If 0 < x < y,
υ(x) = υ(y)φ(t), and s > 0, then υ(x)φ(s) = υ(y)φ(s+ t+ αst), α > 0 .
Obviously A4 follows from A1 and A5. Then AD use A1 and A5 to uniquely
derive discount function
φ(t) = (1+αt)c, c < 0 (1)
as a solution to functional equation
φ(s+ t+αst) = φ(s)φ(t). (2)
(There are a number of possibilities to get equations of type
φ(s)φ(t) = g(s, t)φ(s+ t)
where g(s, t) can be defined depending on the type of solution needed,
including the generalized hyperbolic.) We note that this result in well known
in the literature of functional equations and was first proved by Thielman
[9]. (See also [1] p. 81.) Yet A5 is not needed, and AD’s presumption of (2)
is unnecessary.
Indeed observe that A4 (including also the equality) gives
φ(t)φ(s) ≤ φ(s+ t). (3)
Here Petrovic [7] proves that continuous and convex functions φ do satisfy (3).
(See also [5] pp. 197, 205.) It is straightforward to verify that exponential
function
φ(t) = e−bt (4)
and generalized hyperbolic function
φ(t) = (1 + at)−b/a (5)
are only two from a number of continuous convex functions satisfying (3).
(The a tracks how much (5) departs from constant discounting; as a
approaches zero, (4) obtains.) Thus it follows that there is no need to
artificially assume (2) (as done by AD) to get the exponential and
generalized hyperbolic discount functions.
To justify (2), AD borrow from LP (p. 580)’s derivation and incorrectly
get k = 1+αt . This is incorrect because k does not depend on t. LP explicitly
say (p. 579) that k depends on x and y, but not on t; and LP’s solution (at
p. 580) is only possible assuming k to be constant, i.e. independent of t. So
the solution of LP does not satisfy their functional equation
φ(s)φ(t) = φ(t+ks). (6)
In short, LP’s solution is one of the solutions to (3). Yet their proof to
derive the generalized hyperbolic solution is flawed. What is more, AD’s
remark based on LP’s incorrect proof that k = 1 + αs is flawed too.
3 Evaluating the previous corrections
AD claim four major mistakes made by LP. Now we evaluate these claims.
The corrections are as follows.
1. When defining the elasticity of value function, LP (p. 584) assert that
the value function is more elastic for outcomes that are larger in absolute
magnitude, i.e.
ευ(x) < ευ(y), 0 < x < y or y < x < 0
where ευ(x) = x
υ′(x)
υ(x)
.
AD claim the correct proposition to be the following. The value function
is more elastic for outcomes that are smaller in absolute magnitude, i.e.
ευ(x) > ευ(y), 0 < x < y or y < x < 0.
This correction is appropriate, and the proof given by AD is quite
straightforward.
2. As seen, when considering the common difference effect, LP (p. 579)
impose a linear delay (A4). So if υ(x) = υ(y)φ(s) then υ(x)φ(t) = υ(y)φ(kt+
s), and constant k depends only on x and y. AD warn that the hyperbolic
discount with k = 1 + αs depends only on s, not on x and y. This claim is
misleading, for the reasons discussed in previous section. Over there we fix
LP’s solution by stating that it is one of the solutions to (3). Their proof to
derive the generalized hyperbolic solution is not correct. And AD’s remark
based on LP’s incorrect proof that k = 1 + αs is not correct either.
3. LP employ their model to predict the shape of the optimal
intertemporal allocation of benefits under a constant market present value
constraint. Their equation for optimal consumption plan in the gain domain
is (p. 592)
c′∗ = r −
(
−φ
′(t)
φ(t)
)(
− υ
′
υ′′
)
where r > 0 is a constant real interest rate.
AD suggest that this needs correction. The equation to replace the above
one is
c′∗ =
[
r −
(
−φ
′(t)
φ(t)
)](
− υ
′
υ′′
)
.
We have evaluated this claim and found AD to have a point.
Actually an alternative proof to that of AD can be obtained by going
back to Yaari’s [12] benchmark paper on consumption allocation over time
when preferences depend not only on consumption but also on final wealth
(or bequest). Yaari’s optimal consumption plan (obtained after maximizing
a utility function subject to wealth constraint) yields
er(t−T )φ(t)υ′(c∗(t)) = κ, κ > 0
as a necessary and sufficient condition (Yaari’s equation (12) at p. 307).
Obviously a value function υ is absent from Yaari’s paper. Rather than υ, he
takes a utility associated with the rate of consumption at every moment of
time. He assumes the utility to be twice differentiable and strictly concave.
Yaari concedes this assumption to be strong (p. 305) though without it
no specific implications can be obtained. Taking the value function instead
renders the equation above more robust theoretically.
Taking the derivative of the equation produces
er(t−T )rφυ′(c∗) + er(t−T )φ′υ′(c∗) + er(t−T )φυ′′(c∗)c′∗ = 0
er(t−T )[rφυ′(c∗) + φ′υ′(c∗) + φυ′′(c∗)c′∗] = 0
−(rφ+ φ′)υ′(c∗) = φυ′′(c∗)c′∗
c′∗ =
[
r −
(
−φ
′(t)
φ(t)
)](
− υ
′
υ′′
)
.
And this confirms the correction.
4. In the loss domain, LP (p. 592) state that
r < −
φ′(t)
φ(t)
ευ(Iert)
where I is initial wealth, and ευ(Ie
rt) is increasing.
AD again suggest that this expression is wrong. The correct expression
is
r > −
φ′(t)
φ(t)
( Ie
rt
Iert−c¯)ευ(Ie
rt − c¯) .
By checking this claim we have found AD to be right again.
4 Conclusion
We restate the assumptions in intertemporal prospect theory [6] that underlie
its value and (generalized hyperbolic) discount functions. When reexamining
the theory we have taken the recent Al-Nowaihi and Dhami’s [2] corrections
into account. By doing so, we have found remaining errors in both LP and AD
papers. In particular, we find LP’s proof to derive the generalized hyperbolic
solution to be flawed. AD’s remark based on LP’s incorrect proof ends up
flawed, as a result. These mathematical errors are minor and do not affect
the theory’s critical results. However, by pointing out these mistakes we hope
to contribute to sharpen presentation of intertemporal prospect theory.
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